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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ENDANGERING OTHERS:
HOW ONE SUPREME COURT CASE RATIONALIZED
RISKY CONDUCT DURING A PANDEMIC AS
INTERPRETED IN ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF
BROOKLYN NEW YORK V. CUOMO
ANDRIEL GARY
INTRODUCTION
The American people hold dear to their constitutional rights. For years,
we have repeatedly heard the arguments around the right to keep and bear
arms, the right to free speech, and the right to freedom of religion, and most
have agreed that these rights should be retained by the American people.
But what happens when the exercise of these rights has the potential to endanger others? In Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn New York v. Cuomo, the Supreme Court hastily wrestled with the importance of constitutional rights, the importance of public safety, and when, if ever, it is necessary to temporarily abandon certain constitutional rights, specifically freedom of religion, for the sake of protecting an entire state from the novel
coronavirus.1
This is not the first time the Court has dealt with challenged restrictions
or mandates amid a public health crisis. In Jacobson v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, the Court declined to declare that a state statute that mandated smallpox vaccinations was unconstitutional. The Court recognized
that when necessary a community has the right to protect itself against an
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.2 The Court
further recognized that constitutional rights are not absolute, and there are
many restraints to which every person must be subject for the common
good, as determined by the state authorities, in a health crisis.3

1. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
2. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
3. Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, COVID-19 Related Litigation: Constitutionality of Stay-at-Home, Shelter-in-Place, and Lockdown Orders, 55 A.L.R. Fed 3d Art.
3 (2020) (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26).
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With this, the Court concluded that courts should give deference to state
decisions in a public health crisis and should only
review legislative action in respect of a matter affecting the general welfare if a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.4

Following the reasoning in Jacobson, the Court in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, in response to the current pandemic, again declined to declare that a California executive order limiting attendance capacity at houses of worship was unconstitutional.5 The Court reiterated Jacobson, stating that
our Constitution principally entrusts the safety and the health of the people
to the politically accountable officials of the States to guard and protect.
When those officials undertake [] to act in areas fraught with medical and
scientific uncertainties, their latitude must be especially broad. Where
those broad limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to secondguessing by an unelected federal judiciary, which lacks the background,
competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to
the people.6

Nevertheless, in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, the Court declined to give deference to Governor Cuomos Executive Order No. 202.68
(Continuing Temporary Suspension and Modification of Laws Relating to
the Disaster Emergency)(hereinafter the Emergency Order), placing
capacity limitations on houses of worship located in COVID-19 hotspots.
The Court agreed with the Dioceses argument, stating that the challenged
restrictions violated the minimum requirement of neutrality to religion
required by Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah.7 In Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc, the Court reiterated that a law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo
the most rigorous scrutiny.8

4. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
5. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613
(Mem) (2020) (C.J. Roberts, concurring).
6. Id. at 1613 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38; Marshall v. United States, 414
U.S. 417, 427; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545
(2020)).
7. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 66. (quoting Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)).
8. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546.
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To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of
religious practice must advance interests of the highest order and must be
narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.9 Interests of the highest order would seem to encompass a pandemic that has killed more than 550,000
people to date in the United States and more than two million people globally.10 Yet, the Court in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn seems to
overlook this fact as they struck down an Emergency Order crafted to combat COVID hotspots during the pandemic in the name of respecting a constitutional right that is impossible to enforce or even enjoy without life.
Although our constitutional rights are sacred, it would seem appropriate
that these rights be subjected to regulation when the publics health is at
stake; governmental orders should be respected when it is evident that the
enforcement of these rights could possibly affect the health of others.
This note will explore the impact of the Supreme Courts decision not to
uphold Governor Cuomos capacity restrictions on houses of worship located in red and orange zones during the coronavirus pandemic. This note will
also discuss the initial litigation that initiated the Supreme Courts decision
as well as the case law from which the decision was derived. Lastly, this
note will explore the current state of law at the time the Supreme Court
rendered its decision and review and analyze the rationale behind the
Courts decision to enjoin Governor Cuomos Emergency Order and the
possible effects this decision could have on the health of the public.
THE CASE
On October 6, 2020, the governor of the state of New York, Andrew
Cuomo, issued an Emergency Order that prohibited non-essential businesses, restaurants, schools, and houses of worship from operating at full capacity if the businesses or institutions were located in areas designated as red
or orange zones.11 Areas in New York were designated as red zones if the
area was identified as an area experiencing a concerning increase in

9. Id. (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,628 (1978)).
10. COVID-19 Mortality Overview, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (Apr. 24, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/covid19/mortalityoverview.htm.
11. STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE CHAMBER: CONTINUING TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION AND MODIFICATION OF LAWS RELATING TO THE DISASTER
EMERGENCY, Vol. XLII N.Y. Reg. Issue 44 (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO202.68.pdf
.
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COVID-19 spread.12 Orange zones were considered warning zones, and
yellow zones were precautionary zones.13 In red zones, the following restrictions were imposed: (1) houses of worship were limited to the fewer of
twenty-five percent capacity or ten people, (2) mass gatherings were prohibited, (3) only essential businesses could remain open, (4) dining was
reduced to takeout only, and (5) schools were closed, allowing for remotelearning only.14 In orange zones, the following restrictions were imposed:
(1) houses of worship were limited to thirty-three percent capacity or twenty-five people maximum, (2) mass gatherings were limited to ten people
maximum, indoor and outdoor, (3) essential businesses remained opened
and high-risk non-essential businesses remained closed, (4) dining was reduced to outdoor only with four people maximum, and (5) schools remained closed for remote learning only.15
In response to the Emergency Order, The Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn New York (hereinafter Diocese) filed a complaint against Governor Cuomo, seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against Governor Cuomos Emergency Order. The Diocese argued
that the Emergency Order violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and that their church was treated more harshly than other
comparable secular facilities in the orange and red zones such as pet shops
or grocery stores.16 In two separate orders, the United States District Court
of the Eastern District of New York denied the Dioceses motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.17 The court recognized that the order was not facially neutral and specifically targeted houses
of worship which subjected the capacity limitations to strict scrutiny.18
However, the court reiterated Jacobson in its reasoning, concluding that the
government is afforded wide latitude in managing the spread of deadly
12. Executive Summary: New York Micro-Cluster Strategy (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.cacsd.org/cms/lib/NY01001870/Centricity/Domain/593/MicroCluster
_Metrics_10.21.20_FINAL.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Complaint at 48, Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 493 F.
Supp. 3d 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 20-CV-4844).
17. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 493 F. Supp. 3d 168
(E.D.N.Y. 2020); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 2020 WL 6120167
(E.D.N.Y. 2020), revd 983 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2020) (reversing the federal courts
decision after the Supreme Court enjoined Governor Cuomos Emergency Order).
18. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 493 F. Supp. 3d 168, 171
(E.D.N.Y. 2020).
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diseases and that the Constitution principally entrusts the safety and health
of the people to the politically accountable officials of the States to guard
and protect.19 The court also noted that worship services do not seem
comparable to secular activities permitted under the Executive Order, such
as shopping, in which people do not congregate or remain for extended
periods.20 Lastly, the Court also relied on the Supreme Courts decision in
South Bay United Pentecostal Church where the Court declined to grant
injunctive relief to a church in California who sought to enjoin a similar
executive order that limited attendance at religious services during the pandemic.21 In order to obtain a temporary restraining order, the Diocese was
required to establish (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and (2) that
the balance of equities favored the Diocese.22With both Supreme Court
precedents in mind, the court found those elements lacking and denied the
Dioceses motion for a temporary restraining order.23
In response to the preliminary injunction, the court held that the Dioceses claim was subject to a rational basis rather than strict scrutiny standard of review, the Diocese was not likely to succeed on merits of its claim,
and the balance of equities and public interest did not favor issuance of a
preliminary injunction.24 The court reasoned that under the Emergency Order, religious gatherings were treated more favorably than schools, restaurants, and non-essential businesses which were closed entirely while religious gatherings were permitted with capacity limitations.25 The court further reasoned that the interaction that commonly occurs during worship
services is the type of interaction that could transmit the virus; therefore,
the rules set out in the Emergency Order did not target the religious gatherings because of religion but because of the gatherings, making the strict
scrutiny standard of review inapplicable.26

19. Id. (quoting S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct 1613
(Mem) (2020); Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27
(1905).
20. Id. (quoting Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341,
344 (7th Cir. 2020)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 2020 WL 6120167, revd 983 F.3d 620
(2d Cir. 2020) (reversing the federal courts decision after the Supreme Court enjoined Governor Cuomos Emergency Order).
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id.
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The court also refused to question how the state of New York categorized
essential and non-essential businesses and elected to leave that categorization to the political branches of the state.27 Additionally, the court disagreed
with the Dioceses argument that businesses that were deemed essential,
such as grocery stores, were comparable to religious gatherings; the court
noted that essential businesses like grocery stores typically do not involve
people singing, chanting, or greeting each other in tightly enclosed spaces.28
Lastly, the court reasoned that it would not be in the public interest to grant
an injunction when the Emergency Order was specifically crafted to attack
COVID hotspots in New York. The court concluded that the harm that
could result from failure to contain the virus could be overwhelming, affecting not only the entire public but places of worship as well.29
After the denial of the preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order, the Diocese and Agudath Israel of America and affiliated entities
(hereinafter Agudath), another religious organization who also unsuccessfully sought to enjoin Governor Cuomos Emergency Order , then appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit seeking an
emergency injunction pending appeal of the denial of their preliminary injunction and to expedite their appeal.30 Like the result at lower court, the
Dioceses and Agudaths motion for an emergency injunction was denied.
However, the Second Circuit granted their motion to expedite their appeal.
The court reasoned that when a law burdens religious conduct, and that
burden is not neutral and generally applicable, then the law is subject to
strict scrutiny.31 In this case, the court stated that the Emergency Order was
not subject to strict scrutiny because it was neutral and generally applicable
because the order did not specifically target houses of worship for harsh
treatment since there was other comparable secular public gatherings that
were treated more harshly.32
Additionally, the court noted that the state provided evidence before the
District Court that explained that large commercial stores deemed essential
were not comparable to religious gatherings because in-person religious
services commonly involved prayer and interaction with others over an

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Agudath Israel of America v. Cuomo, 980 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2020).
Id. at 226.
Id.
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extended period of time; the state also showed that it was this type of interaction that posed a higher risk of transmitting the virus.33
The Diocese and Agudath then separately appealed to the U.S Supreme
Court , seeking injunctive relief pending appeal of their preliminary injunction application.34 Because the Diocese and Agudath had the same issue,
the Court addressed both issues in the opinion.35 The Court held that the
Diocese and Agudath were likely to succeed on merits, would be irreparably harmed in the absence of injunctive relief, and public interest favored
injunctive relief.36 Finding that the Diocese and Agudath were likely to
succeed on the merits of the case, the Court reasoned that the Emergency
Order was subject to a strict scrutiny judicial review since there was evidence that houses of worship were treated more harshly than businesses
categorized as essential in red zones and non-essential businesses in orange
zones; in red zones, houses of worship were limited to ten people and in
orange zones houses of worship were limited to twenty-five people.37
From there, the Court found that the Emergency Order served a compelling governmental interest, but the interest was not narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest. The Court reasoned that the restrictions in
the Emergency Order were more restrictive than any COVID-related regulation that previously came before the court, more severe than what was
required to prevent the spread of the virus at the applicants services, and
the Diocese and Agudath could accommodate more than ten or twenty-five
people.38 Finding that the Diocese and Agudath would suffer irreparable
harm, the Court reiterated that loss of First Amendment freedoms, no matter how long, constitute irreparable harm and limiting religious services to
ten people meant that others would be barred from attendance; the Court
noted that Catholics could not receive communion and that there were important religious traditions in the Orthodox Jewish Faith that require personal attendance. Finally, in finding that public interest favored injunctive
relief, the Court stated that there was no evidence attendance at the religious services contributed to the spread of the disease and that the State did
not show that public health would be imperiled if less restrictive measures
were imposed.39
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 227.
Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 66-69.
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BACKGROUND

Human coronaviruses were first identified in the mid-1960s.40 At the
time, there were only four main subcategories of coronaviruses that were
known to affect humans.41 However, there were some coronaviruses that
infected animals that could evolve and make humans sick, becoming a new
type of coronavirus.42 On January 9th 2020, the World Health Organization
(WHO) confirmed fifty-nine cases of a mysterious coronavirus that loomed
in Wuhan, China.43 Unsure of its origin, public health experts kept a close
eye on the new virus.44 As days passed, additional reports of the virus appeared in Thailand and Japan which prompted health officials to begin
screenings at JFK international, San Francisco International, and Los Angeles International airports to follow the transmission of the virus between
Wuhan, China and the United States.45
On January 21st 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
confirmed the first case of the virus in the United States while 200 more
cases in China developed. By January 23rd, China confirmed that 17 people
had died from the virus, and an additional 300 individuals were infected.46
On February 11th 2020, the WHO announced the official name for the virus
was severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), and
the disease it causes was named - COVID-19, an abbreviation of coronavirus disease 2019.47 By May 28th 2020, the virus that seemed to only be on
one side of the world seemingly made its way to the United States, as the
CDC confirmed more than 100,000 Americans had contracted the virus and
died.48 In the midst of an epidemic that turned into a pandemic within a
40. Human Coronavirus Types, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (Feb. 15, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. American Journal of Medical Care, A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments
in 2020, AJMC (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19developments-in-2020.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus that Causes It,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novelcoronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)
-and-the-virus-that-causes-it#:~:text=ICTV%20announced%20%E2%80%9C
severe%20acute,two%20viruses%20are%20different.
48. How Does COVID-19 Spread Between People, Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19): How is it transmitted? WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Apr. 30,
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few months, public health officials went to work to analyze the elements of
the virus and its potential transmissibility.49
As officials learned more about the novel coronavirus, public health experts warned that the virus could be spread through respiratory droplets or
small particles when an infected person coughed, sneezed, sang, talked, or
breathed and that these particles could be inhaled into the nose, mouth, airways, and lungs, causing infection.50 Other warnings revealed that respiratory droplets from an infected person could land on surfaces and objects,
and the virus could be transmitted if those surfaces and objects were
touched by another individual who subsequently touched their eyes, mouth,
or nose.51 There was also evidence that respiratory droplets and airborne
particles could remain suspended in the air or travel distances and be
breathed in by others.52
As public health officials presented this alarming information, state officials began implementing curfews, closing businesses, closing schools,
enacting mask mandates, enforcing isolation and quarantine periods for
infected persons, enforcing social distancing practices, and enforcing stayat-home orders to reduce human interaction.53 Through executive orders,
governors of various states tried to curate plans to reduce the spread of the
virus as it ravaged the United States. Executive orders commonly included
placing severe restrictions on the operations of certain businesses, including
houses of worship, schools, restaurants, gyms, and other establishments that
could potentially increase the spread of the virus.54 As a result of the executive orders, backlash from the public roared over the restrictions placed on
certain businesses; specifically, houses of worship sought to enforce their
constitutional right to freedom of religion amid the pandemic, and the
courts began to see a wave of COVID-19-related litigation.55
Decisions on whether state executive orders that placed capacity limitations on houses of worship violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First

2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/coronavirus-disease-covid-19how-is-it-transmitted#:~:text=Current%20evidence%20suggests%20that%20the
,eyes%2C%20nose%2C%20or%20mouth.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Executive Orders, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
https://web.csg.org/covid19/executive-orders/.
54. Id.
55. Sharp, supra note 3.
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Amendment varied among the courts.56 Federal courts ruled inconsistently,
striking down some executive orders that limited attendance at houses of
worship while upholding others. For example, in Antietam Battlefield KOA
v. Hogan, plaintiffs challenged an executive order that placed capacity limitations on houses of worship limiting attendance of no more than ten people.57 In response, plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the order, arguing that the
capacity limitation violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.58 The court declined to enjoin the executive order, stating:
[L]egislative review is only proper when the legislation or order which
has been enacted to protect the public health has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is beyond all question a plan palpable invasion of
rights secured by the fundamental law.59
The court reasoned that the executive order had real or substantial relation to the public health crisis because the order was enacted to reduce the
spread of the novel coronavirus;60 thus, the purpose of reducing the capacity
at houses of worship was to reduce the spread of COVID-19 which was
easily spread in large groups. As to whether the orders were beyond all
question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law, the court found that the prohibitions were neutral and of general applicability because prohibitions applied to all mass gatherings whether the
conduct involved was religiously motivated or not.61 The court found that
comparable secular facilities were also banned and declined to agree that
businesses that remained opened were comparable to religious gatherings,
as those businesses did not involve groups of people gathering for hours at
a time.62
Similarly, in Cassell v. Snyders, plaintiffs challenged an executive order
that prohibited gatherings of more than ten people and encouraged houses
of worship to use online or drive-in services.63 Plaintiffs argued that the
capacity limitations on religious services violated the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment; however, the court declined to enjoin the execu-

56. See, e.g., Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, 461 F. Supp. 3d 214 (Dist.
of Md. 2020); but see, e.g., Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020).
57. Antietam Battlefield KOA, 461 F. Supp. 3d 214, 224 (D. Md. 2020).
58. Id. at 226.
59. Id. at 228 (quoting Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 27 (1905)).
60. Id. at 229.
61. Id. at 231.
62. Id. at 231-32.
63. Cassell v. Snyders, 458 F. Supp. 3d 981, 989 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
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tive order.64 Like the court in Antietam Battlefield KOA, the court cited Jacobson, reiterating that courts only overturn rules that lack a real or substantial relation to [public health] or that amount to plain, palpable invasion
of rights, and that a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.65 With this, the
court stated that the restrictions in the executive orders aligned with the
principles of Jacobson, and it was evident that the order advanced the governments interest in reducing the spread of COVID-19.66
In Roberts v. Neace, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit enjoined two executive orders that prohibited faith-based mass
gatherings.67 The first executive order prohibited all mass gatherings, and
the second executive order required organizations that were not lifesustaining to close.68 Religious organizations were not included in the lifesustaining category.69 The court stated that the governors restrictions on inperson worship services more than likely prohibited the free exercise of
religion.70 The court noted that an order that is generally applicable will
more than likely be upheld, but orders that discriminate against religion are
commonly invalidated because it is rare for a law to be justified by a compelling interest and [ ] narrowly tailored to advance that interest.71 The
court went on to find that the orders were not motivated by animus toward
people of faith but that the group activities that were allowed removed the
orders from being neutral and of general applicability.72 The court furthered
found that there were other secular activities that were permissible that
posed comparable public health risks, and that there were other less restrictive means that the governor could have undertaken to meet the goal of
reducing the spread of COVID-19.73
Similar to Roberts, the court in First Baptist Church v. Kelly granted a
temporary restraining order in response to an executive order that prohibited mass gatherings of more than ten people which included churches and

64. Id. at 1003.
65. Id. at 993.
66. Id.
67. Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020).
68. Id. at 411-12.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 413.
71. Id. at 413 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 546 (1993)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 414.
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religious services.74 The order allowed those performing at religious services to exceed ten people as long as the individuals followed safety protocols to reduce the spread of COVID-19.75 In granting the temporary restraining order, the court used the analysis in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc., reiterating that laws burdening religion must be of general applicability and if the law is not generally applicable then it is subject to
strict scrutiny.76 Based on this analysis, the court found that the executive
order expressly targeted religion and was not facially neutral.77 The court
reasoned that the disparate treatment could be inferred from the fact that the
houses of worship were subject to stricter treatment because of the nature of
the activity involved rather than evidence showing that these gatherings
posed a greater health risk than commercial mass gatherings or that the
risks at religious gatherings could not be reduced by adhering to safety protocols.78 The court also stated that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in
their assertion that the order was not narrowly tailored to achieve the states
compelling interest to reduce COVID-19 spread; the court found that there
were essential secular mass gatherings comparable to religious gatherings
that were subject to conditions that were not as harsh.79
Unlike the lower courts that varied in their decisions to uphold challenged governmental orders, the Supreme Court initially deferred to governmental orders that restricted mass gatherings amid the pandemic. In
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, plaintiffs sought to enjoin an executive order that placed capacity limitations at places of worship
to twenty-five percent of building capacity or a maximum of 100 attendees.80 The Court declined to enjoin the order, stating [s]imilar or more
severe restrictions apply to comparable secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showing, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended
periods of time.81
The Court further found that the order excluded or treated only activities
that were considered dissimilar more leniently, such as grocery stores,
banks, and laundromats in which people neither congregate in large groups
74. First Baptist Church v. Kelly, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1081 (D. Kan.).
75. Id. at 1082.
76. Id. at 1088.
77. Id. at 1089.
78. Id. at 1089-90.
79. Id.
80. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613
(Mem) (2020) (C.J. Roberts, concurring).
81. Id. (C.J. Roberts, concurring).
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nor remain in close proximity for extended periods.82 Likewise, in Calvary
Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining
order against an executive order that reduced capacity limitations at houses
of worship to no more than fifty people while some establishments were
permitted to operate at fifty percent capacity.83 The Court confirmed the
lower courts findings that the case was similar to South Bay United Pentecostal Church and held that the executive order was neutral and of general
applicability and did not violated the Free Exercise Clause of First
Amendment.84
ANALYSIS
In each case where the court is presented with challenges to capacity limitations on houses of worship, the courts consistently consider whether the
capacity limitations are also applicable to comparable secular gatherings in
reaching their decisions. This is how the Court in Roman Catholic Diocese
of Brooklyn confirmed the decision that the challenged restrictions were not
neutral and of general applicability and were subject to strict scrutiny.85 The
Court found that a synagogue or a church in a red zone could only admit ten
persons, but businesses categorized as essential in red zones (such as grocery stores, campgrounds, pet stores, and transportation facilities) could
admit as many as they wish.86 In orange zones, attendance at houses of
worship could only admit twenty-five persons, and non-essential businesses
could decide for themselves how many persons to admit.87
On their face, the restrictions do appear to subject houses of worship to
disparate treatment with the assumption that houses of worship are essential. However, deeper analysis of the COVID-19 spread in New York tells a
different story: the capacity limitations on houses of worship in red and
orange zones are necessary. Before the issuance of the Emergency Order at
issue, Governor Cuomo worked with public health officials in curating an
initiative called the New Yorks Micro-Cluster Strategy to identify areas
with increased COVID-19 spread and placing those areas under severe restrictions until viral transmission could be controlled.88 The strategy involved identifying clusters of increased COVID-19 cases in neighborhoods
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. (C.J. Roberts, concurring).
Sharp, supra note 3.
Sharp, supra note 3.
Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66.
Id. at 65-66.
Id.
Executive Summary, supra note 12.
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and small areas and designating those areas as red zones to contain the
spread in that particular area.89 Surrounding the red zone areas were areas
identified as orange zones to prevent further spread of the red zone areas,
and surrounding orange zones were areas identified as yellow zones to help
prevent the spread of COVID-19 from red and orange zones.90 Therefore,
houses of worship in designated red zones were considered to be in areas
with high rates of COVID-19 cases.91
Public health officials have warned the population that sitting in enclosed
spaces for extended periods of time and engaging in activity that involves
singing, speaking, or even breathing hard increases the risk of transmitting
the coronavirus.92 The activity involved in synagogues and churches is essentially the very same activity that is known to transmit the virus. Yet, the
Court overlooks this integral part of understanding the transmissibility of
the virus as the Court looks at other establishments that involve activity that
is nowhere near comparable to the same activity conducted in a synagogue
or church. It is common knowledge that traffic in and out of grocery stores
is constant; persons do not congregate in grocery stores for extended periods of time, and it is rare for a grocery store, on a regular day, to be so
compacted that a sneeze could potentially find its way into another persons
airways.93
Additionally, the Court mentions that the Diocese and Agudath can accommodate up to 1000 people in conjunction with social distancing practices,94 but so can NBA arenas and NFL stadiums. Despite the ability to do so,
recent news has shown that these organizations have opted not to take that
risk and have either prohibited fans from entry or substantially reduced
capacity limitations.95 With the enjoinment of Governor Cuomos Emer89. Id.
90. Executive Summary, supra note 12.
91. Executive Summary, supra note 12.
92. Ramananda Ningthoujam, COVID-19 Can Spread Through Breathing,
Talking, Study Estimates, CURR MED RES PRACT, May-June 2005, at 132-33.
93. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct 1613 (Mem) (C.J.
Roberts, concurring).
94. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67.
95. Todd Haislop, NBA bubble, explain: A complete guide to the rules, teams,
schedule & more for Orlando games, SPORTING NEWS (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.sportingnews.com/us/nba/news/nba-bubble-rules-teams-scheduleorlando/zhap66a9hcwq1khmcex3ggabo; Todd Haislop, Will there be fans at NFL
games in 2020? Team-by-team attendance & ticket policies during COVID-19,
SPORTING NEWS (Sept. 27, 2020), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/fansat-nfl-games-2020-covid-19-attendance-tickets/1vh5xyd47cokq17yykgepds6zi.
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gency Order, houses of worship in red and orange zones are permitted to
engage in risky conduct that could potentially spread COVID-19. Consequently, Governor Cuomos entire initiative to target clusters and restrict
activity to contain the spread of COVID-19 is substantially undermined
because a small portion of the cluster, houses of worship, does not have to
abide by the restrictions in the Emergency Order. Accordingly, services at
houses of worship could potentially act as super-spreader events if a congregant is infected.96
That is not to say that the Court did not acknowledge the current state of
the world. The Court did recognize that reducing the spread of COVID-19
was a compelling state interest, but the Court declined to recognize that the
challenged regulations were narrowly tailored to achieve those interests,
noting that the challenged restrictions are more restrictive than any
COVID-related regulation that have previously come before the court.97
This may be true, but the Court neglected to acknowledge that, at the beginning of the pandemic, New York accounted for five percent of the coronavirus cases worldwide.98 It was the efforts and initiatives of Governor
Cuomo and public health officials through their daily testing and dramatic efforts to wipe out clusters of infections before they could spread
that eventually reduced New Yorks infection rate to one percent, one of
the lowest rates in the United States at the time.99
However, the Court believed that the capacity limitations on the Dioceses and Agudaths religious services were more severe than necessary to
prevent the spread of COVID-19.100 The spread of COVID-19 is quite unpredictable. Public health experts have stated that COVID-19 symptoms
may not show until almost two weeks after exposure; furthermore, some
infected individuals do not show any symptoms at all but still have the abil-

96. Health and Wellness, Superspreader Events and Small Gatherings: COVID19
Safety
Tips,
PENN
MEDICINE
(Dec.
10,
2020),
https://www.pennmedicine.org/updates/blogs/health-and-wellness/2020/december
/covid-super-spreader.
97. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67.
98. New York Has Roughly 5% of Coronavirus Cases Worldwide, N.Y.
TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/22/nyregion/
coronavirus-new-york-update.html.
99. Audio & Rush Transcript: Governor Cuomo Is a Guest on CNN Newsroom
with Poppy Harlow and Jim Sciutto, MEDIA (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/audio-rush-transcript-governor-cuomo-guestcnn-newsroom-poppy-harlow-and-jim-sciutto.
100. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67.
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ity to infect others.101 Therefore, it seems reasonable to implement capacity
limitations on places in high-risk areas to lessen the high possibility of virus
transmission; this is exactly what Governor Cuomo was trying to do and
should have been afforded the broad latitude to do so.
As stated in Jacobson, a community has the right to protect itself
against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.102 Governor Cuomo tried to exercise this right by placing capacity
limitations on houses of worship located in red and orange zones. However,
the only right the Court seemed to be concerned with was the constitutional
right to freedom of religion, stating that the loss of First Amendment freedoms for even minimal periods of time constitutes irreparable injury.103
The Court reasoned that members of the churches and synagogues would be
deprived of the right to equally attend worship services, take communion,
and other activities within their faith that required personal attendance.104
Agreeably, constitutional rights are sacred and represent some of the
most fundamental rights that we have in a free society; however, constitutional rights are not absolute and can be regulated in certain scenarios especially when the conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed
some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order.105 The First
Amendment right to free speech can be regulated if it is used to incite violence or imminent lawless action;106 similarly, the Second Amendment right
to keep and bear arms can be and is regulated to prevent firearm possession
by certain people and within certain places.107 Therefore, it would not be
abnormal to defer to the right of state officials to regulate conduct that has a
101. Claire Gillespie, Whats the Difference Between Asymptomatic and Presymptomatic Spread of COVID-19? EXPLORE HEALTH (June 11, 2020),
https://www.health.com/condition/infectious-diseases/coronavirus/asymptomaticvs-presymptomatic.
102. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905).
103. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67-68.
104. Id.
105. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (recognizing that constitutional rights are not absolute and can be regulated if the conduct interrupts public
safety), abrogated by Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015).
106. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free speech do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action).
107. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (noting that the right to
possess a firearm is not absolute and can be regulated in certain circumstances).
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high likelihood of transmitting a virus that has killed over 400,000 people
to date.108
Was it truly safe to say that it was in the public interest to enjoin the
Emergency Order? The Court answered in the affirmative, noting that no
evidence was shown that the services in the churches or synagogues contributed to the spread of the disease or that public health would be imperiled if less restrictive measures were imposed.109 To date, however, the
coronavirus cases in New York have spiked since the conclusion of the
case, and New York is averaging about 13,492 cases per day.110 Although
there is no way to confirm or deny the spike came from religious services,
the increased numbers show that the restrictive measures Governor Cuomo
implemented in red and orange areas were necessary and in the publics
interest. The areas in question where the churches and synagogues are located have since been reclassified to yellow zones.111 However, if Governor
Cuomo needed to reimplement those capacity limitations on religious services, the power to do so has been taken away from him; this ruling is a
hindrance to state officials who need to implement certain restrictions to
contain the spread of the virus.112
CONCLUSION
The rationale the Court used in enjoining Governor Cuomos Emergency
Order does not comport with our current circumstances. Action from state
officials will be crucial to controlling the virus, and the Court has limited
the power of state officials to implement necessary measures to ensure the
virus does not continue to spread. Although our constitutional rights are
sacred, they are not absolute. During a public health crisis where more than
108. Mazzei, supra note 10.
109. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67-68.
110. New York Coronavirus Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/new-york-coronavirus-cases.html.
111. Jon Campbell, New York lifts COVID restrictions in all orange zones, most
yellow zones. What it means, DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/2021/01/27/new-york-liftscovid-restrictions-all-orange-zones-most-yellow-zones/4275589001/.
112. Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Grants California Churchs Challenges to
Coronavirus
Restrictions,
USA
TODAY
(Dec.
3,
2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/12/03/supreme-court-orderreverse-covid-19-limit-california-churches/3781911001/; see California Coronavirus Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/us/california-coronavirus-cases.html (revealing California coronavirus rates which confirm that the state is also a COVID-19 hotspot).
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400,000 people have died and cases of the infected continue to rise, governmental orders crafted with the help of public health experts should be
respected. State officials who have the knowledge and expertise in the
needs of their locality should be given the broad latitude to make necessary
decisions to nurse their state back to good health. State officials should not
be subject to second-guessing by an unelected federal judiciary, which
lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and
is not accountable to the people.113

113. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct 1613 (Mem)
(2020). (C.J. Roberts, concurring) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
38 (1905); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427; Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 545 (2020).

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol43/iss2/5

18

